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BOOK REVIEW
THE CONVERGENCE OF FEMINIST AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES PRINCIPLES IN THE
PORNOGRAPHY DEBATE
WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP. Edited by Varda Burstyn. Vancouver,
B.C.: Douglas & McIntyre Ltd. 1985. Pp. vii, 210.
Reviewed by NADINE STROSSEN*
INTRODUCTION
According to its editor, the aim of Women Against Censorship,' a
provocative collection of essays by leading North American feminist
writers and activists, 2 is to show that "for women freedom lies not in
accepting censorship [of pornography], but in repudiating it.''3 In pursu-
ing this aim, the book effectively attacks two shibboleths concerning the
recently burgeoning public debate about pornography: "that all feminists
have a uniform assessment of pornography and uniformly advocate its
* Associate Professor of Clinical Law, New York University. B.A., 1972, J.D., 1975,
Harvard University. The reviewer is General Counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union
and a member of the National Advisory Committee of the ACLU's Reproductive Freedom
Project. She gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Filomen D'Agostino and
Max E. Greenberg Research Fund of the New York University School of Law, the research
assistance of Joanne Lelewer and Catherine Siemann, and the word processing assistance of
Karen Hollins and Michael Portantiere.
I Women Against Censorship (V. Burstyn ed. 1985).
2 The contributors include artists, teachers, journalists, lawyers, and scholars who have
been active in the feminist movement. See id. at 209-10. Varda Burstyn describes herself as a
writer on political and cultural issues, a teacher of film studies, a video producer, and a radio
broadcaster, who has been involved in the women's movement since 1967. Id. at 209. Reflect-
ing the activist orientation of their authors, the essays are "not academic pieces," but rather
"documents of struggle-partisan, passionate, committed." Burstyn, Introduction to Women
Against Censorship 12 (V. Burstyn ed. 1985).
Notwithstanding the nonscholarly tone and anecdotal content of many essays in the book,
the major points they make withstand more rigorous analysis, as indicated in this Essay.
These pieces constitute a valuable response to feminist procensorship writings precisely be-
cause so many of them also do not employ traditional scholarly rhetoric or analysis, but are
rather "chronicles of real events and experiences by women involved in the process they de-
scribe." Id. (describing contributions to Women Against Censorship). See, e.g., A. Dworkin,
Pornography: Men Possessing Women (1981); Fritz, Pornography as Gynocidal Propoganda,
8 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 219 (1978-1979); MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights
and Speech, 20 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1985).
3 Burstyn, supra note 2, at 3.
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censorship"; 4 and that, in consequence, the pornography debate pits fem-
inists, who view pornography as a principal cause of sex discrimination
and violence against women, against civil libertarians, who view it as pro-
tected free speech.5 These false assumptions have been perpetuated by
the leaders of the feminist procensorship movement.6 Further, the arro-
gation by procensorship feminists of the right to define "the" feminist
view of pornography is paralleled by their arrogation of the right to de-
fine what sexual behavior and imagery is acceptable from "the" feminist
viewpoint.7 Thus, contemporary feminist advocates of censorship, simi-
lar to other advocates of censorship throughout history, seek to impose
their views not only on what others should read, but also on how others
should behave."
Women Against Censorship demonstrates the falseness of the pur-
ported dichotomy between feminist and civil libertarian principles and
shows how censorship and other governmental regulations of pornogra-
phy would violate both sets of principles.9 As June Callwood explains:
"Feminism and civil liberties are inextricable. The goal of both is a soci-
4 Id. at 2. Feminists who oppose censorship have been systematically ignored by both the
media and politicians. See e.g., Burstyn, Policital Precedents and Moral Crusades: Women,
Sex and the State, in Women Against Censorship 4, 26 (V. Burstyn ed. 1985).
5 See, e.g., Lerman, Preface to Colloquium, Violent Pornography: Degradation of Women
Versus Right of Free Speech, 8 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 181, 184 (1978-1979)
("Although some speakers [at colloquium] bridged the gap between the feminists and the civil
libertarians, there was a general failure of communication."). This often overblown conflict is
accentuated by the use of the terms "feminists" and "civil libertarians" as if they were mutu-
ally exclusive. Many individuals, including the author of this Essay, reasonably consider
themselves to be described accurately by both terms. To make the point, this Essay hereafter
will avoid the nouns "feminist" and "civil libertarian" and instead will refer to feminist "prin-
ciples" and civil liberties "principles."
6 See, e.g., Dworkin, Pornography: The New Terrorism, 8 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change
215, 217, 218 (1978-1979) (denouncing defenders of free speech principles as "politically self-
righteous fellow travelers of the pornographers" and asserting that "[t]he concept of 'civil
liberties' in this country has not ever, and does not now, embody principles and behaviors that
respect the sexual rights of women"); MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev.
321, 325 (1984) ("Pornography, in the feminist view, is a form of forced sex.., an institution
of gender inequality." (emphasis added)). See also Jacobs, Patterns of Violence: A Feminist
Perspective on the Regulation of Pornography, 7 Harv. Women's L.J. 5, 23 (1984)
("[F]eminists... reject the liberal view that all pornography should be free from restriction
and censorship ....").
7 See note 26 infra; text accompanying notes 75-77, 88-95 infra.
8 See Burstyn, Political Precedents and Moral Crusades: Women, Sex and the State, in
Women Against Censorship 4, 12 (V. Burstyn ed. 1985) (in late nineteenth century many
feminists joined with other groups to organize "Social Purity" movement to press for legisla-
tion that would enforce their views of acceptable sexual behavior).
9 For Varda Burstyn's view of feminism, see Burstyn, supra note 8, at 23 ("Because of the
far-reaching implications of feminism, the basic principles of the women's movement---equal-
ity in social standing, opportunity and remuneration, a change in the antagonistic relations
between the sexes-have come to embody the aspirations of great numbers of women and men
for a better life for all.").
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ety in which individuals are treated justly. Civil libertarians who oppose
censorship are fighting on behalf of feminists, not against them." 10 The
book thereby makes a significant contribution to the ongoing public dis-
cussion about the causes, effects, and potential control of pornography.
The feminist antipornography and procensorship movement, which
has been gaining substantial influence during the past decade, I ' suffered a
legal setback in 1986. The Supreme Court, in Hudnut v. American Book-
sellers Association,12 summarily affirmed lower court rulings invalidating
an Indianapolis ordinance that was based upon model legislation drafted
by feminist procensorship leaders Andrea Dworkin and Catharine
MacKinnon. Reflecting the authors' view that pornography is "[c]entral
to the institutionalization of male dominance,"'13 this legislation aimed to
prohibit pornography as "a practice of discrimination on the basis of
sex." 4 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Hudnut, the
movement to censor pornography-including its feminist component-
remains active and influential. 15 In fact, this movement recently was fu-
eled by the report of the so-called Meese Commission, 16 which recom-
mended numerous governmental measures to curb pornography, 17 and
10 Callwood, Feminist Debates and Civil Liberties, in Women Against Censorship 121, 129
(V. Burstyn ed. 1985).
11 See Snitow, Retrenchment Versus Transformation: The Politics of the Antipornography
Movement, in Women Against Censorship 107, 110-13 (V. Burstyn ed. 1985).
12 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986), aff'g 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'g 598 F. Supp. 1316 (D.
Ind. 1984).
13 MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 321.
14 MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 27. For excerpts from the version of the model legislation
adopted by the Indianapolis City Council, Indianapolis, Ind., Code § 16-3(q)(1984), see Wo-
men Against Censorship, supra note 1, app. at 206-08. Concerning the widespread influence of
this model law, see Duggan, Hunter & Vance, False Promises: Feminist Antipornography
Legislation in the U.S., in Women Against Censorship 130 (V. Burstyn ed. 1985) ("Other
versions of the legislation are being considered in numerous cities, and Pennsylvania Senator
Arlen Specter has introduced legislation modeled on parts of the Dworkin-MacKinnon bill in
the U.S. Congress.").
Is See, e.g., Shenon, A Second Opinion on Pornography's Impact, N.Y. Times, May 18,
1986, at A8; Voters in Maine Defeat Anti-Obscenity Plan, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1986, at A32.
The scholarly debate concerning the feminist critique of pornography, and its relationship
to free speech values, has also continued to flourish after the Supreme Court's decision in
Hudnut. See, e.g., Branit, Reconciling Free Speech and Equality: What Justifies Censorship?,
9 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 429 (1986) (opposing censorship); Stone, Anti-pornography Legisla-
tion as Viewpoint-Discrimination, 9 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 461 (1986) (same); Sunstein, Por-
nography and the First Amendment, 1986 Duke L.J. 589 (supporting censorship); see also
Brest & Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution: The Anti-Pornography Move-
ment in Minneapolis, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 607 (1987) (presenting actions taken and arguments
made concerning one city's consideration of Dworkin-MacKinnon legislation).
16 Attorney Gen.'s Comm'n on Pornography, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Final Report (1986)
[hereinafter Meese Commission Report].
17 On October 22, 1986, Attorney General Meese announced plans to begin implementing
the recommendations contained in the Meese Commission Report. These plans included the
creation of a "Center for Obscenity Prosecution" in the Justice Department and the desig-
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which endorsed some of the central views reflected in the Dworkin-
MacKinnon model law.18
Given the continued vitality of the procensorship movement, an ac-
curate understanding of the full range of feminist views on pornography,
and of the overlap between many such views and civil liberties principles,
is of ongoing importance to the women's rights cause. In the current
political and legal milieu, in which the women's rights movement is em-
battled on many important fronts, internal struggles and alliances with
nonfeminists on the pornography question make the movement vulnera-
ble to a "divide and conquer" strategy. 19 As Varda Burstyn observes:
"The convergence between conservatism and important sectors of femi-
nism [concerning the pornography issue] has offered politicians and bu-
reaucrats a wonderful opportunity to undermine feminism while
appearing its champions."'20
Part I of this Essay demonstrates that, notwithstanding exaggerated
accounts of conflict, there are broad areas of consensus among propo-
nents of both feminist and civil liberties principles on significant issues in
the pornography debate. Part II shows why censorship would be as in-
imical to fundamental feminist principles as it would be to essential civil
liberties precepts. Part III demonstrates that, in terms of feminist and
civil liberties values, the costs of censorship would not be offset by any
substantial resulting benefits. In particular, Part III discusses the lack of
evidence that censoring pornography would reduce discrimination or vi-
olence against women. Finally, Part IV outlines some alternative meas-
ures for combating discrimination and violence against women that are
consistent with feminist and civil liberties principles.
nation of a "taskforce" of attorneys to coordinate antipornography efforts among the FBI,
Postal Service, Customs Service, and United States Attorneys' offices. Mr. Meese also an-
nounced that a legislative package embodying the Commission's proposals would be intro-
duced in Congress. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1986, at Al.
18 See, e.g., Meese Commission Report, supra note 16, at 329-35 (concluding that most
pornography depicts women in positions of "degradation, domination, subordination and hu-
miliation," and as "existing solely for the sexual satisfaction of others," that "substantial expo-
sure" to this material "is likely to increase the extent to which those exposed" will hold certain
negative attitudes toward women, and that exposure to this material bears some causal rela-
tionship to sexual violence and sex discrimination against women).
19 See Snitow, supra note 11, at 114 (stating that feminist pornography debate "has led to
scapegoating inside the women's movement").
20 Burstyn, supra note 8, at 25. Similarly, writing before the Meese Commission issued its
report, Burstyn predicted that it would "manipulate feminist concerns to provide cover for an
anti-feminist agenda." Id. at 26. In the same vein, another contributor to Women Against
Censorship, Lisa Steele, notes that many politicians rationalize their failure to support such
fundamental feminist goals as reproductive rights and equal pay by citing their support of
censorship. Steele, A Capital Idea: Gendering in the Mass Media, in Women Against Censor-
ship 58, 61 (V. Burstyn ed. 1985). In Steele's apt phrase, "Censorship is the cheapest item on
the shopping list of the women's movement." Id. at 61.




NONCENSORSHIP ASPECTS OF THE PORNOGRAPHY DEBATE:
BROAD CONSENSUS AMONG ADVOCATES OF
FEMINIST AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
PRINCIPLES
The significant areas of agreement among proponents of feminist
principles and civil liberties principles concerning pornography can be
clarified by examining individually the various issues entailed in that
debate. Whether censorship is a principled or effective response to por-
nography is only one of the relevant issues. Whether pornography serves
any beneficial purpose, whether it contains any positive imagery, and
whether there are other ways to address the perceived problems associ-
ated with pornography are all pertinent issues as well. The common
failure to consider these issues separately generates confusion and exag-
gerates the disagreements among advocates of feminist and civil liberties
precepts.
First, there is a broad consensus among those who have studied it
that much sexually explicit speech that is commonly labeled "pornogra-
phy" serves a variety of positive purposes. For example, even the Meese
Commission acknowledged that "[t]here are... two areas in which sexu-
ally explicit materials have been used for positive ends: the treatment of
sexual dysfunctions and the diagnosis and treatment of some
paraphilias."21 Popular sex manuals have recommended pornography as
an aphrodisiac, 22 and there is widespread belief that it can improve the
sex lives of some couples. 23 Furthermore, some clinical24 and cross-cul-
tural25 evidence suggests that the use of pornography might even reduce
21 See Meese Commission Report, supra note 16, at 1028. Moreover, the Meese Commis-
sion recognized that pornography might have other "beneficial effects," including providing
entertainment, relieving people of the impulse to commit crimes, and improving marital rela-
tions by teaching about sexual techniques. Id.
22 See, e.g., The Joy of Sex 208-09 (A. Comfort ed. 1972).
23 See American Civil Liberties Union, Polluting the Censorship Debate: A Summary and
Critique of the Final Report of the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography 76-77
(July 1986) [hereinafter ACLU Report].
A commission that reported to the President on pornography in 1970 found that the
regular adult consumers of pornography represent a cross-section of the population. Profes-
sional people, persons active in their communities, happily married couples, and highly edu-
cated persons are as represented as all other social categories. See Commission on Obscenity
and Pornography, Report 128-34 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Commission Report].
24 See E. Donnerstein, Erotica and Human Aggression 127-28 (1984) ("[A] good amount
of research [since 1971] strongly supports the position that exposure to certain types of erotica
can actually reduce aggressive responses in people who are predisposed to aggress."). Profes-
sor Donnerstein's research is often cited (not necessarily correctly, see text accompanying
notes 145-57 infra) by advocates of censoring pornography.
25 See ACLU Report, supra note 23, at 67, 78-81. For example, data indicate that sex
crimes decreased in Denmark after pornography was legalized there in the 1960s, and further
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the likelihood that certain individuals will engage in antisocial activity,
including violence against women.
Moreover, although some pornography contains negative imagery,
including violence toward women,26 pornography also contains numer-
ous positive images. In her contribution to Women Against Censorship,
Ann Snitow describes some of the diverse positive facets of pornographic
imagery.
Pornography sometimes includes elements of play, as if the fear
women feel toward men had evaporated and women were relaxed and
willing at last. Such a fantasy-sexual revolution as fait accompli-
... can... be wishful, eager and utopian.
Porn can depict thrilling (as opposed to threatening) danger....
[S]ome of its manic quality... seems propelled by fear and joy about
breaching the always uncertain boundaries of flesh and personality.
that there are correlations between the increased availability of "hardcore" pornography in
Denmark and West Germany and a decrease in sex offenses against children in both countries.
Kutchinsky, Pornography and Its Effects in Denmark and the United States: A Rejoinder and
Beyond, 8 Comp. Soc. Res. 301, 319-21 (1985); Kutchinsky, The Effect of Easy Availability of
Pornography on the Incidence of Sex Crimes: The Danish Experience, 29 J. Soc. Issues 163
(1973); Kutchinsky, Towards an Explanation of the Decrease in Registered Sex Crime in Co-
penhagen, in 7 Technical Report of the U.S. Comm'n on Obscenity & Pornography 263
(1971). For similar data from Japan, see Abramson & Hayashi, Pornography in Japan: Cross-
Cultural and Theoretical Considerations, in Pornography and Sexual Aggression 173 (N.
Malamuth & E. Donnerstein eds. 1984). It should be noted that the data described above, as is
true of all existing data showing the relationship between the availability of pornography and
actual antisocial behavior, demonstrate only correlations and not causation.
Some other studies report a positive correlation between the availability of pornography
and the level of crime, but also provide no evidence as to any causal relationship. See Baron &
Straus, Sexual Stratification, Pornography, and Rape in the United States, in Pornography and
Sexual Aggression 185, 195-98 (N. Malamuth & E. Donnerstein eds. 1984) (reporting correla-
tion between circulation rates of popular men's sex magazines and rate of reported rape in
United States); Court, Pornography and Sex Crimes: A Re-Evaluation in the Light of Recent
Trends Around the World, 5 Int'l J. Crim. & Penology 129 (1977).
26 Procensorship feminists see violent pornography as unmitigated antifemale propaganda.
See, e.g., S. Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape 394 (1975) (calling por-
nography "the undiluted essence of antifemale propaganda"); Dworkin, supra note 6, at 217
("Pornography is the propaganda of sexual fascism [and] of sexual terrorism."); Fritz, supra
note 2, at 220 ("[Plornography is nothing less than genocidal propaganda."); Longino, Por-
nography, Oppression, and Freedom: A Closer Look, in Take Back the Night: Women on
Pornography 40 (L. Lederer ed. 1980) ("Pornography is the vehicle for the dissemination of a
deep and vicious lie about women.").
Even violent pornography, however, may convey something other than antifemale propa-
ganda. See Panel Discussion: Effects of Violent Pornography, 8 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
Change 225, 237 (1978-1979) (statement of Professor David Richards).
Susan Sontag has noted that violent pornography expresses something about the some-
times extreme nature of sexual ecstasy and the fantasies we experience in having sex. It
enables some of us more frankly to acknowledge and deal with the integrity of our sex-
ual selves, not in terms of some puritan model of proper sexual life, but in terms of
unique selves and life histories.
Id.
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Hostility haunts the genre, but as part of a psychodrama in which
... [m]other is the ultimate spectre and women, too, have moments of
glee when she is symbolically brought low.
Some pornography is defiant and thumbs a nose at death, at the
limitations of the body and nature.
Porn offers... a private path to arousal, an arousal that may be
all too easily routed by fear or shame.
.... [P]ornography also flouts authority, which no doubt in part
explains its appeal to young boys. Certainly... porn remains one of
their few sources of sexual information .... 27
Pornographic imagery also contains many elements that are harmo-
nious with feminist values. For example, as another contributor to
Women Against Censorship, Nan Hunter, noted elsewhere, pornography
"may convey the message that sexuality need not be tied to reproduction,
men or domesticity. ' 28 In fact, one of the reasons censoring pornography
27 Snitow, supra note 11, at 115-16; see also Kostash, Second Thoughts, in Women Against
Censorship 32, 37 (V. Burstyn ed. 1985). ("[U]ntil there is a revolution in the institutions that
regulate sexual relations-the family, the school, the workplace-perhaps the pornographic
fantasy is one of the few ways that women and men, captives together of those institutions,
victims alike of their alienating procedures, are permitted connection.").
For a compelling statement of additional positive aspects of pornographic imagery, see
Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment,
123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 81 (1974).
[P]omography can be seen as the unique medium of a vision of sexuality, a
"pornotopia"-a view of sensual delight in the erotic celebration of the body, a concept
of easy freedom without consequences, a fantasy of timelessly repetitive indulgence. In
opposition to the Victorian view that narrowly defines proper sexual function in a rigid
way that is analogous to ideas of excremental regularity and moderation, pornography
builds a model of plastic variety and joyful excess in sexuality. In opposition to the
sorrowing Catholic dismissal of sexuality as an unfortunate and spiritually superficial
concomitant of propagation, pornography affords the alternative idea of the independent
status of sexuality as a profound and shattering ecstasy.
Id.
28 The quoted statement appeared in a brief Nan Hunter co-authored with Professor Sylvia
Law of New York University School of Law. Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship
Taskforce at 30, American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (No. 84-
3147), aftd, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986) [hereinafter FACT Brief]. Other profeminist aspects of
pornography are noted in the essay in Women Against Censorship that Hunter co-authored.
[P]omography has served to flout conventional sexual mores, to ridicule sexual hypoc-
risy and to underscore the importance of sexual needs. Pornography carries many
messages other than woman-hating: it advocates sexual adventure, sex outside of mar-
riage, sex for no reason other than pleasure, casual sex, anonymous sex, group sex,
voyeuristic sex, illegal sex, public sex. Some of these ideas appeal to women reading or
seeing pornography, who may interpret some images as legitimating their own sense of
sexual urgency or desire to be sexually aggressive.
Duggan, Hunter & Vance, supra note 14, at 145; see also Diamond, Pornography: Image and
Reality, in Women Against Censorship 40, 40 (V. Burstyn ed. 1985) ("[Fleminism and porn
have something in common. Both insist that women are sexual beings. Both have made sex an
experience open to public examination and, now, debate."). Even pornography depicting vio-
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would offend feminist values is that it would suppress these empowering
images.
Perhaps because of these positive and profeminist aspects of much
pornography, supporters of feminist principles who advocate censorship
or other governmental regulation do so only with respect to a relatively
limited category of pornography: namely, that which depicts the sexual
subordination of women.29 Although many supporters of both feminist
and civil liberties principles believe that even this limited subset of por-
nography should not be regulated or censored, 30 many simultaneously
recognize that "[s]peech which... depicts the sexual subordination or
humiliation of any person or group is extremely offensive."' 3 1 Accord-
ingly, adherents of both feminist and civil liberties principles support
nongovernmental efforts to counter pornography that depicts sexual sub-
ordination. 32 For example, expressing both feminist and civil liberties
concerns, Sara Diamond writes: "Community picket lines and sit-ins
aimed at porn outlets can be effective, but only if we are careful about
who we ally ourselves with and channel our anger, not calling for state
censorship, but for consumers and communities to take responsibility for
the images that they accept."'33 The feminist antipornography movement
already has made significant progress toward countering pornographic
lence against women can convey messages affirming women's equality and otherwise consistent
with feminist principles. See note 26 supra; note 92 and accompanying text infra.
29 See Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography and Equality, 8 Harv.
Women's L.J. 1, 13-17 (1985); MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 22 ("Obscenity as such probably
does little harm."); see also Steinem, Erotica and Pornography: A Clear and Present Differ-
ence, Ms., Nov. 1978, at 53 (describing "erotica" as depiction of mutually pleasurable, volun-
tary sexual expression and "pornography" as depiction of sex being used to create or enforce
some inequality).
For the definition of that "pornography" subject to regulation or proscription under the
Dworkin-MacKinnon model legislation, see note 64 and accompanying text infra. This defini-
tion is both broad in conception and difficult to limit in application. See text accompanying
notes 65-75, 80-87 infra. Nevertheless, it is clear that the definition's framers intended it to
describe a subset of all speech commonly regarded as obscenity or pornography.
30 Under this view, the offensive nature of any speech, including degrading pornography,
cannot justify its censorship. See text accompanying notes 51-52 infra.
31 Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and the Indiana Civil Liberties Union Amici
Curiae at 1, American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Ind. 1984) (No. IP
84-791C), aff'd, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986) [hereinafter ACLU
Briefl.
32 For a discussion of non-governmental strategies to counter pornography that are consis-
tent with feminist and civil libertarian values and goals, see note 34 infra; text accompanying
notes 160-70 infra.
33 Diamond, supra note 28, at 53; see also Kaminer, A Woman's Guide to Pornography
and the Law, The Nation, June 21, 1980, at 754, 756 ("The feminist movement against pornog-
raphy must remain an antidefamation movement, involved in education, consciousness-raising
and the development of private strategies against the [pornography] industry.").
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images of sexual subordination34 by using the constitutionally appropri-
ate35 antidote to any objectionable speech: more speech rebutting it.
There is a further consensus among proponents of feminist and civil
liberties principles that private antipornography efforts should be but-
tressed by government action to combat the various types of harmful
conduct that some contend are caused or aggravated by pornography.
For example, the American Civil Liberties Union endorses the following
measures:
[e]nforcement of criminal laws regarding assault, coerced sex, kidnap-
ping and trespassing; strengthening of the rape laws including elimina-
tion of the "spousal rape" exception, under which husbands may not
be prosecuted for raping their wives; enforcement of... sex discrimi-
nation laws... [and bringing of] tort[ ] or contract claims [by victims
of sexual offenses]. 36
In fact, adherents of civil liberties and feminist values generally sup-
port in principle (if not in the particulars of implementation 37) two of
34 See ACLU Brief, supra note 31, at I ("By emphasizing the degree to which sexually
explicit speech glorifying humiliation and violence is fundamentally inconsistent with our na-
tional commitment to equality, proponents of the Indianapolis antipornography ordinance
contribute to public understanding of the need to eradicate sex discrimination and violence
against women from American life."); Jacobs, supra note 6, at 43 (noting that national groups
that have organized protests and other private action against pornography include Women
Against Pornography, Women Against Violence in Pornography and Media, Feminists
Against Pornography, and Women Against Violence Against Women). For an example of the
successful use of one private antipornography tactic, see Penrod & Linz, Using Psychological
Research on Violent Pornography to Inform Social Change, in Pornography and Sexual Ag-
gression 247, 271-72 (N. Malamuth & E. Donnerstein eds. 1984). In response to a threat by
Women Against Violence Against Women, Warner Communications immediately removed a
billboard portraying a bound and bruised woman with the caption "I'm Black and Blue from
the Rolling Stones-and I Love It," and further agreed to stop using images of violence against
women in its advertisements. Id.
35 See text accompanying note 158 infra.
36 American Civil Liberties Union, Policy Guide 8-9 (rev. ed. June 1986) [hereinafter
ACLU Policy Guide] (on file at New York University Law Review) (Policy No. 4(f), adopted
1985).
37 Notwithstanding the theoretical compatibility of laws penalizing these criminal activities
with feminist and civil liberties principles, the particular way in which the Dworkin-MacKin-
non law is framed raises serious problems with respect to both sets of principles. For discus-
sion of some conflicts between feminist principles and the particular provisions of the
Dworkin-MacKinnon law, see text accompanying notes 43-46, 54, 59-61, 71-109 infra. For
discussion of some of the ways in which these provisions conflict with civil liberties principles,
see text accompanying notes 43-46, 51-53, 58, 158-59 infra.
Furthermore, the Dworkin-MacKinnon law's definition of "pornography," which is con-
stitutionally defective, is incorporated within all of its operative provisions. Therefore, all such
provisions-including the ones concerning the coerced performance for or viewing of pornog-
raphy-are equally defective. This is precisely what the Seventh Circuit ruled in holding the
entire Indianapolis ordinance unconstitutional. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut,
771 F.2d 323, 332-33 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986) (stating that law's noncen-
sorship provisions might be constitutionally salvageable but would require complete rewriting
because its definition of "pornography" is "defective root and branch").
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the four operative provisions in the Dworkin-MacKinnon model anti-
pornography legislation: those that prohibit coercing women either to
pose for pornographic pictures 38 or to view pornographic material.39
First, to coerce anyone to pose for any photograph or movie, includ-
ing a pornographic one, transgresses not only feminist4° and civil liber-
ties41 values, but also current legal norms.42 However, before allowing
legal redress to someone who was allegedly coerced to pose under cur-
rent legal norms, a court would have to find that the situation really did
involve coercion rather than voluntary choice. The paternalistic notion
that women can never freely consent to pose for sexually explicit pictures
or films, which appears to underlie the Dworkin-MacKinnon formula-
tion of the coerced posing cause of action,43 contravenes feminist and
38 The relevant portion of the model law provides: "It shall be sex discrimination to coerce,
intimidate, or fraudulently induce... any person .. into performing for pornography."
Dworkin, supra note 29, at 25.
39 The relevant portion of the model law provides: "It shall be sex discrimination to force
pornography on a person... in any place of employment, education, home, or public place."
Id. at 26-27.
40 Such coercion violates core feminist values affirming individual autonomy. See
Goldman, The Traffic in Women, in Feminism: The Essential Historical Writings 308 (M.
Schneir ed. 1972) (basic to feminist principles is "passionate belief in individual freedom" and
"the right of women to live as free and equal human beings"); see also S. de Beauvoir, The
Second Sex 473-79 (1968); B. Friedan, The Feminine Mystique 62-95 (1963).
41 Such coercion violates core civil liberties values opposing involuntary servitude and af-
firming individual autonomy and privacy. See, e.g., ACLU Policy Guide, supra note 36, at
431 (Policy No. 401(e)(2), adopted 1973) ("The ACLU... favors ratification by the United
States of... the International Labor Organization Resolution of [sic] Forced Labor (1957)
".... ); id. at 349 (Policy No. 264, adopted 1975) ("The right of individual privacy...
extends to sexual conduct of consenting adults." (emphasis added)).
42 See Duggan, Hunter & Vance, supra note 14, at 147.
Existing law already penalizes physical assault, including when it is associated with por-
nography. Defenders of the [Dworkin-MacKinnon] laws often cite the example of mod-
els who have been raped or otherwise harmed while in the process of making
pornographic images. But victims of this type of attack can already sue or prosecute
those responsible.... [Additionally], existing U.S. law already provides remedies for
fraud or contracts of duress ....
Id. In addition, privacy-related torts recognized in many states could provide legal recourse for
women who have been physically or psychologically coerced into posing for pornography. See
generally Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 392-401 (1960) (discussing torts of public
disclosure of private facts and public portrayal in a false light).
The tort of wrongful appropriation might also apply. See Clark v. Celeb Publishing, Inc.,
530 F. Supp. 979, 982-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (awarding damages to model for emotional distress
on misappropriation theory where pornographic magazine wrongfully used nude photographs
of her). If broadly construed, these causes of action could transgress free speech values. How-
ever, as the ACLU recognizes, under certain relatively narrow circumstances, the false light
and wrongful appropriation actions may be maintained consistent with civil liberties princi-
ples. See ACLU Policy Guide, supra note 36, at 12-13 (Policy No. 6(a), adopted 1983).
43 The Dworkin-MacKinnon model law in effect creates a presumption that a woman was
coerced to pose for a pornographic work by providing that proof of any of the following shall
not negate a finding of coercion:
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civil liberties tenets. Some women who were previously pornographic
models have said that they were coerced to perform through physical
violence.44 However, others declare that they and their colleagues per-
form voluntarily,45 and indeed assert their constitutional right to do so.46
Similarly, coerced viewing of any material is inconsistent with femi-
nist and civil liberties principles and current legal standards. Thus,
where viewers are part of a captive audience, because they must be in a
public place to pursue important personal goals, such as employment or
education, their privacy interests in avoiding offensive speech may out-
weigh the countervailing free speech interests.47 At least where offensive
that the [allegedly coerced] person actually consented to a use of the performance that is
changed into pornography; or... that the person knew that the purpose of the acts or
events in question was to make pornography; or... that the person showed no resis-
tance or appeared to cooperate actively in the photographic sessions or in the events that
produced the pornography; or... that the person signed a contract, or made statements
affirming a willingness to cooperate in the production of pornography; or... that no
physical force, threats, or weapons were used in the making of the pornography; or...
that the person was paid or otherwise compensated.
Dworkin, supra note 29, at 26-27.
According to some proponents of feminist and civil liberties principles, the foregoing pro-
vision goes beyond protecting against actual coercion and instead "functions to make all
women incompetent to enter into legally binding contracts for the production of sexually ex-
plicit material." FACT Brief, supra note 28, at 41. Therefore, they reason, enforcement of
this portion of the model ordinance would worsen rather than improve the working conditions
of pornography models. Id.; see Duggan, Hunter & Vance, supra note 14, at 148. In fact, the
City of Indianapolis's brief in federal district court analogized women to children and con-
tended that both should be deemed incapable of consenting to pose for pornography. Id.; cf.
MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 15 (analogizing women to children and prisoners).
44 See, e.g., L. Lovelace & M. McGrady, Ordeal (1980).
45 See Effect of Pornography on Women and Children: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Juvenile Justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 317 (1984) (testi-
mony of Veronica Vera) (actress in and maker of pornographic films testifying that she had
"never met one woman who was coerced... into participating").
46 See The War Against Pornography, Newsweek, Mar. 18, 1985, at 58, 66 ("For them to
tell me I can't make films about naked men and women making love is a grotesque violation of
my civil rights." (emphasis in original) (quoting pornographic film model)).
47 See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (upholding prohibition
of political advertisements in city-owned buses partly "to minimize... the risk of imposing
[ideas] upon a captive audience"); see also id. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that
commuters were present as matter of "practical necessity"). Although the Supreme Court has
not had occasion to define the outer bounds of the captive audience concept, the lower federal
courts and scholarly commentators have concluded that members of an audience should be
deemed captive whenever they cannot leave without incurring a substantial burden, or are in a
place where they have a right or privilege to remain. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness v. MeAvey, 450 F. Supp. 1265, 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); L. Tribe, American Con-
stitutional Law § 12-19, at 678 n.13 (1978); Comment, "I'll Defend to the Death Your Right
to Say it... But not to Me"-The Captive Audience Corollary to the First Amendment, 1983
S. Ill. Univ. L.J. 211, 220.
For discussion of balancing of free speech and privacy interests in a captive audience
context, see L. Tribe, supra, at 677 & n.13; Black, He Cannot Choose but Hear: The Plight of
the Captive Auditor, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 960 (1953); Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a
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speech is intentionally directed at an individual for purposes of harass-
ment, feminist principles, civil liberties principles,48 and current law
49
converge to support a remedy. Likewise, feminist principles, civil liber-
ties principles, and current law all would protect against the invasion of
privacy that would result from forced exposure to pornography in the
home.50
Before allowing legal redress, however, it would have to be proven
that the situation did in fact involve forced exposure and not exposure
that could have been avoided. 51 Free speech values generally require
Right Not to be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L. Rev. 153 (1972). The Supreme Court has cautioned
that every case "pitting the First Amendment rights of speakers against the privacy rights of
[others] ultimately must depend on its own specific facts." Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1975). This "delicate balancing" is required because "'the interests on
both sides are plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our society.'" Id. at
208-09 (quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975)).
48 In addition to violating privacy interests, such displays also undermine civil liberties and
feminist interests in eliminating sex discrimination in employment and education. See, e.g.,
ACLU Policy Guide, supra note 36, at 400 (Policy No. 316, adopted 1984) (stating that impo-
sition of adverse job-related consequences because of employee's response to unwelcome sexual
expression amounts to harassment and discrimination).
49 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1982), long has been interpreted as protecting employees against racist displays intended to
create an offensive or hostile work environment. See, e.g., Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d
1094, 1102-03 (2d Cir. 1986). Therefore, if employers or co-workers confront a woman with
pornography in an effort to poison her work atmosphere or to harass her, Title VII should
afford relief. Title VII bars the creation of an offensive work environment through sexual
harassment regardless of whether the employee suffers tangible negative effects. Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2405-06 (1986). Sexual harassment claims involving pornog-
raphy have been sustained where the pornography was intentionally used to harass a particular
employee. See, e.g., Arnold v. City of Seminole, 614 F. Supp. 853, 858, 868-69 (E.D. Okla.
1985). However, the mere display of pornographic pictures in workplaces has been held not to
constitute sexual harassment. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 433
(E.D. Mich. 1984).
50 In Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970), the Supreme Court
upheld a federal statute that allowed individuals to remove their names from mailing lists and
stop all future mailings to their homes of" 'matter which the addressee in his sole discretion
believes to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative.'" Id. at 730 (quoting Postal Reve-
nue and Federal Salary Act of 1967 § 301(a), 39 U.S.C. § 4009(a) (1982)).
Although, as the Court held in Rowan, a state may permit individuals to choose not to
receive certain types of speech in their homes, the government may not make this choice for
them. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (government may not prohibit mail-
ing of sexually explicit advertisements, although some recipients might find them offensive).
Because the Dworkin-MacKinnon model legislation does not define the term "coercion," it
raises the risk that the government could act as censor in the manner prohibited by Bolger. See
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 333 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 106 S. Ct.
1172 (1986).
51 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (finding that first amendment was
violated by defendant's conviction for holding jacket with words "Fuck the Draft" in court-
house corridor and that first amendment interests were not overcome by interests in protecting
any passersby who might find these words offensive, because they could have averted their eyes
from the jacket).
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anyone confronted with an offensive image in a public place to bear the
burden of avoiding it by averting his or her eyes.5 2 The Dworkin-Mac-
Kinnon legislation jeopardizes these free speech principles because it
broadly proscribes forced exposure to pornography "in any place of em-
ployment, education, home, or public place" without imposing a limiting
definition upon the concept of "force."'5 3 This section of the model law
apparently reflects the same type of paternalistic assumptions that under-
lie its provision proscribing forced modeling for pornography, and thus
collides with feminist and civil liberties principles for this additional
reason.
54
The two provisions of the Dworkin-MacKinnon legislation regard-
ing coerced posing or viewing are not targeted at the legitimate feminist
and civil libertarian concerns with preventing coercion. Not only are
they overinclusive, purporting to extend remedies to women who were
not in fact forced, but as measures ostensibly aimed at actual coercion,
these provisions are also fatally underinclusive. They afford no remedy
to women who were in fact forced to pose for or view any material other
than the particular subset of sexually explicit material that the ordinance
labels "pornography. '55
As the foregoing portion of this Essay has demonstrated, proponents
of feminist and civil liberties principles broadly agree on certain impor-
tant points concerning the consequences and control of pornography, in-
cluding some types of governmental regulations. There are, however,
two types of governmental measures to control pornography that some
proponents of feminist principles advocate, but that, in the final analysis,
actually conflict with feminist and civil liberties values. These measures
are exemplified by the two remaining operative provisions of the Dwor-
kin-MacKinnon model legislation. One of these measures, censorship,
has provoked the greatest controversy among advocates of feminist and
civil liberties precepts and will be discussed separately in Part 11.56
The other measure, although in theory repugnant to both civil liber-
ties and feminist tenets, in practice would probably have limited impact.
Specifically, the model legislation provides that if any physical assault "is
directly caused by specific pornography," then the "maker(s), distribu-
tor(s), seller(s), and/or exhibitor(s) may ... be sued for damages and for
an injunction against the specific pornography's further exhibition, distri-
52 See id.; Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975).
53 Dworkin, supra note 29, at 26-27 (emphasis added).
54 See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra; see also Duggan, Hunter & Vance, supra note
14, at 148-50.
55 For a definition of "pornography" for the purposes of the model legislation, see note 64
infra.
56 See text accompanying notes 63-126 infra.
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bution or sale."' 57 By making producers or distributors of a work liable
for harmful conduct it might inspire in some viewer, this legislation
would lead to pervasive self-censorship, which would be as inimical to
free speech values as direct censorship imposed by the government.58 As
noted by several essays in Women Against Censorship, this type of legisla-
tion would also damage feminist values, 59 because speech promoting
such values would be a prime target for self-censorship.A6
57 Dworkin, supra note 29, at 27.
58 See Lynn, "Civil Rights" Ordinances and the Attorney General's Commission: New
Developments in Pornography Regulation, 21 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 27, 88-89 (1986).
If the measure of permissible suppression becomes what one or two people might do in
response to particular speech, we will all be reduced to sitting in darkened rooms in
order to prevent sexual (or other) images from crossing the eyes or mind of someone
who could react in an antisocial manner. The fundamental argument is not about sexual
imagery; it is whether we can afford to curtail speech because of its overt effect on a few
people.
Id.
59 See, e.g., Duggan, Hunter & Vance, supra note 14, at 150.
[Adoption of such a cause of action] would mean, for example, that the producer of the
TV Movie The Burning Bed, which told the true story of a battered wife who set fire to
her sleeping husband, could be sued if a woman who saw the film killed her husband in a
similar way. The result, of course, would be the end of films depicting real violence in
the lives of women.
Id. Lynn reports that The Burning Bed has led to at least two incidents of male violence
against females. Lynn, supra note 58, at 88. Lynn also points out how the "direct causation"
remedy in the Dworkin-MacKinnon model law would lead to regulation or censorship of femi-
nist literature more generally, even beyond the specific subset of feminist literature depicting
violence against women.
[I]t is argued in some feminist theories that violent pornography, and even the rise of
sexual assaults, is a misogynist response to the challenge of the women's movement. If a
piece of feminist literature led even one man to respond with violence, should it too be
regulated, under a theory that it caused him to feel threatened and triggered him to act
out his aggression?
Id. at 87-88 (citation omitted).
In her concluding essay in Women Against Censorship, Varda Burstyn notes more ad-
verse consequences for feminism of a measure imposing liability on producers or distributors of
pornography. "[S]uch an approach sets a precedent that could result in descriptions and de-
pictions of acts-of birth control, of abortion, of extra- or premarital sex, of lesbian sex, for
example-being used to penalize those who have expressed their opinions and/or desires."
Burstyn, Beyond Despair: Positive Strategies, in Women Against Censorship 152, 161 (V. Bur-
styn ed. 1985).
60 Precisely because of the draconian self-censorship that would follow, established legal
precedents hold that the first amendment forbids making creators or distributors of works
accountable for all actions that might, to some extent, be caused by the works. Rather, the
creators and purveyors of speech may be held accountable for ensuing conduct, and the speech
itself may be regulated in order to avert such conduct, only if there is both an element of intent
and a close nexus between the speech and conduct that would have serious adverse conse-
quences. See note 159 infra.
This general principle of free speech jurisprudence has been adopted specifically in the
context of sexually explicit speech. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1957)
(rejecting notion that sexually oriented speech could be regulated in light of its potential effect
upon the most suggestible person who might see it); see also Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383
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This cause of action is inconsistent with feminist and civil liberties
values for the additional reason that it dilutes the accountability of indi-
viduals who commit violent crimes against women by displacing some of
it onto words and images or onto those who create or distribute them.
Referring to Suffolk County, New York, where a version of the Dworkin-
MacKinnon model law was being considered, Lisa Duggan, a contribu-
tor to Women Against Censorship, wrote: "[T]he right-wing men were
lining up out in Suffolk to say, 'Hey, we like this idea. Pornography
causes violence against women, not men!' "61
Notwithstanding the fundamental problems, in principle, with this
section of the Dworkin-MacKinnon model law, it should be noted that
any assault victim would probably find it hard to show the "direct"
causal nexus between her assault and a specific pornographic work that is
a prerequisite for recovery under the section.62
II
CENSORSHIP OF PORNOGRAPHY WILL ENDANGER BOTH
FEMINIST AND CIVIL LIBERTIES PRINCIPLES
The remaining provision of the Dworkin-MacKinnon legislation,
which calls for censoring pornography,63 provokes the greatest disagree-
ment among proponents of feminist and civil liberties principles. The
"pornography" subject to censorship under the Dworkin-MacKinnon
law is defined as any "sexually explicit subordination of women through
U.S. 413, 432 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The First Amendment demands more than a
horrible example or two of the perpetrator of a crime of sexual violence, in whose pocket is
found a pornographic book, before it allows the Nation to be saddled with a regime of
censorship.").
61 Quoted in Blakely, Is One Woman's Sexuality Another Woman's Pornography?, Ms.,
Apr. 1985, at 37, 47 (emphasis in original); see also FACT brief, supra note 28, at 49-50.
Women Against Pornography describe as victims of pornography married women co-
erced to perform sexual acts depicted in pornographic works, working women harrassed
[sic] on the job with pornographic images, and children who have pornography forced
on them during acts of child abuse. Each of these examples describes victims of violence
and coercion, not of images. The acts are wrong, whether or not the perpetrator refers
to an image. The most wholesome sex education materials, if shown to a young child
... could be used in a viciously harmful way. The law should punish the abuser, not the
image.
Id. (citation omitted).
62 Many cases have held that plaintiffs failed to show a sufficiently direct causal connection
between media imagery and a third person's allegedly imitative behavior to permit plaintiffs to
hold the media accountable for the third person's behavior consistent with the first amend-
ment. See, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 325, 333 & n.4 (7th Cir.
1985) ("The constitutional requirements for a valid recovery for assault caused by speech
might... be too rigorous for any plaintiff to meet."), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986); cases cited
in Lynn, supra note 58, at 90-92.
63 See Dworkin, supra note 29, at 26 (stating that model provision would make it illegal
"to produce, sell, exhibit, or distribute pornography").
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
April 1987
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
pictures and/or words" that also conforms to at least one of nine criteria
such as "women are presented dehumanized as sexual objects, things or
commodities," or "women are presented in postures or positions of sex-
ual submission, servility, or display." 64 The model law's broad, vague
definition of proscribed works65 violates both feminist and civil liberties
principles66 by endangering much valuable literature, art, and scholarly
material, including many feminist works. 67 The breadth of the Dworkin-
MacKinnon legislation is not just the accidental product of poor draft-
64 See id. at 25. The other criteria are:
(ii) women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or
(iii) women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in being
raped; or
(iv) women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or
physically hurt; or...
(vi) women's body parts - including but not limited to vaginas, breasts or buttocks -
are exhibited such that women are reduced to those parts; or
(vii) women are presented as whores by nature; or
(viii) women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or
(ix) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, torture, shown as filthy or
inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual.
Id. This definition of "pornography" applies to all of the law's operative provisions, not just
the censorship section.
65 The Dworkin-MacKinnon censorship legislation transgresses feminist and civil liberties
values for reasons transcending this legislation's particular definition of pornography, prob-
lematic as that is. For example, analysis of a recent proposal to censor a more narrowly de-
fined class of pornography demonstrates that even this narrower antipornography legislation
violates both feminist and civil liberties principles. See text accompanying notes 110-26 infra.
66 That any censorship scheme is inimical to fundamental civil liberties principles protect-
ing freedom of expression is a familiar theme, which has been widely discussed. See, e.g., L.
Tribe, supra note 47, § 12-16, at 665-70. This general theme has been extensively explored in
the context of the Dworkin-MacKinnon proposal. See, e.g., ACLU Brief, supra note 31;
Emerson, Pornography and the First Amendment: A Reply to Professor MacKinnon, 3 Yale
L. & Pol'y Rev. 130 (1984); Lynn, supra note 58; Neier, Expurgating the First Amendment,
The Nation, June 21, 1980, at 750; Tigue, Civil Rights and Censorship-Incompatible Bedfel-
lows, 11 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 81 (1985).
For discussion of some of the free speech principles violated by the Dworkin-MacKinnon
model legislation see text accompanying notes 51-53 supra and 158-59 infra. As does Women
Against Censorship, however, this Part emphasizes the less widely discussed feminist principles,
rather than the more familiar free speech principles, that militate against censoring
pornography.
67 This danger is effectively illustrated by the appendix to the ACLU's trial court brief in
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Ind. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 323
(7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986), which compiled a "brief sampling of materials
which the ordinance on its face appears to proscribe." ACLU Brief, supra note 31, app. at Ia.
[T]he ordinance would deter the distribution of much.., erotic literature of considera-
ble literary or historic value. In addition, works of fiction from authors such as Aris-
tophanes, Shakespeare, Fielding and Mailer include sexually explicit material in which
women are arguably presented "as sexual objects for domination, conquest, exploitation
[or] possession .... " [Hence, all of these works would be jeopardized under the ordi-
nance.]
The visual arts would be similarly affected. Erotic images occupy a prominent
place in the Western artistic tradition, from paleolithic cave-drawing to contemporary
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ing. To the contrary, the scope of the model statute accurately reflects its
drafters' views68 about the scope of the underlying problem 69 and its ap-
propriate solution.7o
As noted by several contributors to Women Against Censorship, the
traditional stereotypes reflected in the feminist antipornography, procen-
sorship position ultimately rest upon the "very traditional concern that
explicit sexuality itself constitutes the degradation of women. '71 Conse-
painting and sculpture.... Not even religious imagery-often sexually explicit-would
be immune.
[Tihe ordinance would prohibit much clinical sexual literature, from medical texts
and scholarly studies to popularized works of sociology and self-help. Since the sexual
subordination of women is a historical reality, the ordinance would be likely to deter
much historical or anthropological work graphically describing such perspectives or
practices. Much post-Freudian psychological as well as prominent philosophical litera-
ture involves the notion of sexual objectification [and would therefore be endangered
under the ordinance].
Ironically, much overtly feminist scholarly material designed to address the same
concerns prompting the [ordinance] would appear to fall within [its] sweeping definition
of pornography. Prominent examples include Kate Millett's The Basement, a graphic
chronical of sexual torture;... works on rape, wife beating and domestic violence; court
testimony and photographic evidence in rape and sexual assault cases; works like
Brownmiller's Against Our Will: Men, Women & Rape; and psychiatric literature
describing sexual pathologies and therapeutic modalities. Indeed, Pornography: Men
Possessing Women, a work of Andrea Dworkin, one of the ordinance's original drafters,
contains... so many... passages graphically depicting the explicit sexual subordination
of women that it could easily be pornographic under the ordinance.
Id. at la-8a (footnotes omitted); see also Callwood, supra note 10, at 127 ("[L]aws meant to
catch pornography that shows the mutilation of women could also be applied to war coverage
on the news.").
6S For statements of these views, see Dworkin, supra note 29; MacKinnon, supra note 2;
MacKinnon, supra note 6.
69 See Emerson, supra note 66, at 132.
As Professor MacKinnon emphasizes, male domination has deep, pervasive and long-
existing roots in our society, and it is not surprising that our literature, art, entertain-
ment and commercial practices are permeated by attitudes and behavior that create and
reflect the inferior status of women. If the answer to the problem, as Professor MacKin-
non describes it, is governmental suppression of sexual expression that contributes to
female subordination, then the net of restraint has to be cast on a nearly limitless scale.
Even the attempt to narrow a proscribed area to depiction of sexual activities involving
violence would outlaw a substantial portion of the world's literature.
Id.
70 Burstyn and other contributors to Women Against Censorship argue that
there has been among the antipornography feminists, a series of subtle shifts in ideas
about the forms and causes of women's oppression. From an appreciation of the mul-
tidimensional reality of masculine dominance, vocal feminists have been increasingly
narrowing their focus to one dimension:... pornography. Women's attention has been
diverted from the causes to the depictions of their oppression.
Burstyn, supra note 8, at 25-26.
71 Carole Vance, quoted in Blakely, supra note 61, at 40 (emphasis in original); see also
Duggan, Hunter & Vance, supra note 14, at 142-43.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
April 1987]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
quently, the feminist procensorship movement targets the same type of
speech that has been "the traditional target of obscenity law: sexually
explicit material."' 72 Because of its focus on sexually explicit speech, the
Dworkin-MacKinnon model law is both overinclusive and underinclu-
sive with respect to its avowed goals of reducing sex discrimination and
violence against women.
Even if there were, arguendo, a causal relationship between imagery
and attitudes or action,73 the law would remain fatally overinclusive be-
cause it curbs much sexually explicit speech that can reasonably be per-
ceived as neither sexist nor violent.74 As observed by contributors to
Women Against Censorship, the law's wide suppression of sexually ex-
plicit imagery, beyond that which is overtly sexist or violent, ultimately
reflects the view that, for women, all heterosexual sex (as well as much
homosexual sex) is inherently sexist.75 To emphasize that the feminist
procensorship position rests upon traditional, stereotypical views disap-
proving sex and denying women's sexuality, anticensorship proponents
of feminist and civil liberties principles have characterized their own
views as "pro-sex."'76 The basic contours of these opposing "anti-sex"
and "pro-sex" positions-which are linked, respectively, to the pro- and
anticensorship positions-are delineated by Duggan, Hunter, and Vance
as follows:
Underlying virtually every section of the [Dworkin-MacKinnon model
law] there is an assumption that sexuality is a realm of unremitting,
unequalled victimization for women.... But this analysis is not the
only feminist perspective on sexuality. Feminist theorists have also ar-
gued that the sexual terrain, however power-laden, is actively con-
tested. Women are agents, and not merely victims, who make
Embedded in this [feminist procensorship] view are several... familiar themes: that sex
is degrading to women, but not to men; that men are raving beasts; that sex is dangerous
for women; that sexuality is male, not female; that women are victims, not sexual actors;
that men inflict "it" on women; that penetration is submission; that heterosexual sexual-
ity, rather than the institution of heterosexuality, is sexist.... It's ironic that a feminist
position on pornography incorporates most of the myths about sexuality that feminism
has struggled to displace.
Id.
72 Duggan, Hunter & Vance, supra note 14, at 143.
73 See text accompanying notes 134-55 infra (discussing lack of evidence to support this
purported causal connection).
74 Even worse, the law could be used to suppress sexually explicit speech that conveys
messages opposing sex discrimination and violence against women and promoting feminist and
civil liberties values. See, e.g., Burstyn, supra note 59, at 160; text accompanying note 28 supra
and 84, 88-93 infra.
75 See, e.g., Duggan, Hunter & Vance, supra note 14, at 139; Snitow, supra note 11, at 118.
76 See, e.g., Ehrenreich, What Is This Thing Called Sex?, The Nation, Sept. 24, 1983, at
245. For collections of "pro-sex" writings, see Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexu-
ality (C. Vance ed. 1984); Powers of Desire (A. Snitow, C. Stansell & S. Thompson eds. 1983).
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decisions and act on them, and who desire, seek out and enjoy
sexuality. 77
The law's focus on sexually explicit speech makes it under- as well
as overinclusive. Several essays in Women Against Censorship describe
the imagery of sexism and violence that permeates our culture through
vehicles including advertising, television, movies, and popular fiction, but
that would not be affected by the ordinance.78 In order to advance its
asserted goal of eradicating sexist and violent imagery, the ordinance
would have to address these everyday examples of such imagery, as well
as those contained in the particular type of pornography with which it is
exclusively concerned.79
One could argue that the model law's overbreadth could be amelio-
rated by a narrow statutory construction. In reviewing the Indianapolis
version of the law, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals gave serious
consideration to this approach. However, after separately addressing the
potential salvageability of each operative provision, 80 the Seventh Circuit
concluded that "[n]o amount of struggle with particular words and
phrases in this ordinance can leave anything in effect. '' 81 This conclusion
followed from the court's determination that the law's definition of por-
nography was "defective root and branch."8 2
Even assuming that the Dworkin-MacKinnon legislation could in
theory be construed narrowly, there is no way to ensure that such a limit-
ing construction would actually occur. The interpretation and applica-
77 Duggan, Hunter & Vance, supra note 14, at 151. The "anti-sex" position essentially
posits a mutual inconsistency between a woman's freedom and her participation in sexual rela-
tions with men. To the contrary, the "pro-sex" position views these phenomena as mutually
reinforcing. See, e.g., Snitow, supra note 11, at 120. ("Ti Grace Atkinson says, 'I do not know
any feminist worthy of that name who, if forced to choose between freedom and sex, would
choose sex.' While women are forced to make such a choice we cannot consider ourselves
free."); see also Burstyn supra note 59, at 180 (describing twin goals of those who support
feminist principles as "freedom for women and sexual joy for all").
78 See, e.g., Steele, supra note 20, at 60-74. In comparing an advertisement for dishwash-
ing detergent with one that displayed stereo equipment on the reclining body of a bikini-clad
woman, Steele notes:
Ads for dishwashing detergents... are aimed at the female consumer; sexuality is sel-
dom enlisted in the service of selling these products, which involve domestic labor.
Here, the image of the "ordinary woman," sans bikini, is used to conjure up the right
feeling in the potential consumer. Is one of these views of Woman more false than the
other? More damaging?
Id. at 64.
79 This observation should not be construed as an endorsement of any such broader regula-
tion. To the contrary, many of the flaws in the Dworkin-MacKinnon scheme would be magni-
fied by extending it to a wider range of materials.
80 See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332-34 (7th Cir. 1983), aff'd,
106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986).
81 Id. at 334.
82 Id. at 332.
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tion of the statute could not be reserved to individuals espousing feminist
and civil liberties views. Anyone could invoke the legislation, and its
broad terms necessarily confer wide interpretive discretion upon any gov-
ernment official or judge who applies it. The broad room this legislation
gives to government officials for implementing their personal value judg-
ments about sexuality means that there is no way to prevent individuals,
government enforcement agencies, or courts from following antifeminist,
anti-civil-libertarian views in interpreting and applying it. Several essays
in Women Against Censorship highlight this danger by showing how cen-
sorship laws have been used to promote antifeminist views regarding sex-
uality.83 Indeed, as noted in the essay by filmmaker Anna Gronau, the
works of feminist artists are particularly vulnerable to censorship under
laws modeled on the Dworkin-MacKinnon legislation because it should
be more important for them to explore the psychological and social links
between sex and violence.84
The essay by Lisa Duggan, Nan Hunter, and Carole Vance illus-
trates how this legislation can be used to censor works produced and
valued by the very feminists who supported it. For example, they re-
count that in Suffolk County, New York, a version of the Dworkin-
MacKinnon legislation was "put forward by a conservative, anti-ERA
male legislator who wished to 'restore ladies to what they used to be,'"
and its supporters claimed that pornography causes "'sodomy' and 'dis-
ruption' of the family unit ... -"5 The proponents of this Suffolk County
antipornography measure typify the many government officials and pri-
vate citizens who oppose pornography not because they associate it with
sex discrimination, but rather because they associate it with other phe-
nomena that they do oppose: homosexuality, interracial sex, divorce,
83 For example, Lynn King's essay in Women Against Censorship shows that, while assert-
ing the purpose of protecting women, the influential Ontario Board of Censors has exercised its
discretionary power "not [to] eliminat[e] misogynist images, but mainly [to] ensur[e] that ex-
plicit sexuality is avoided and traditional values upheld." King, Censorship and Law Reforms:
Will Changing the Laws Mean a Change for the Better?, in Women Against Censorship 79,
80-81 (V. Burstyn ed. 1985). In fact, the Board recently censored a profeminist film. Id. at 84;
see also Kostash, Second Thoughts, in Women Against Censorship 32, 38 (V. Burstyn ed.
1985) (noting that although Canadian customs officers found reproductions of sexually explicit
art in Penthouse Magazine obscene, they did not make the same finding with respect to sexu-
ally explicit cartoon in same magazine that depicted violence against a woman).
84 See Gronau, Women and Images: Toward a Feminist Analysis of Censorship, in Women
Against Censorship 91, 97 (V. Burstyn ed. 1985) ("Censorship can only accentuate the taboos
that already surround women's open exploration of their sexuality. There are too many other
obstacles now in place to women becoming artists or writers, or even speaking out publicly,
without inviting the judicial control of censorship.").
85 Duggan, Hunter & Vance, supra note 14, at 133. Further, the only feminists to make
public statements about the Indianapolis ordinance opposed it; all Republican city-county
council members supported the ordinance, while all Democratic members opposed it. Id. at
132-33.
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birth control, abortion, and the breakdown of the traditional family. s6 It
is therefore not surprising that this group of pornography opponents
would utilize the broad interpretive discretion that the Dworkin-Mac-
Kinnon legislation affords them to construe it in ways antithetical to fem-
inist and civil liberties principles. 87
Further, as noted by several contributors to Women Against Censor-
ship, among the feminist imagery that would be jeopardized by the
Dworkin-MacKinnon law, lesbian imagery would be especially endan-
gered. 88 Because it outlaws images of "subordination" or "degrada-
tion," 89 without defining those terms, the ordinance empowers judges
and other government officials who believe that these pejorative labels
apply to homosexual sex to censor depictions of lesbian sexuality.90
In fact, images of many types of sexual behavior in which individu-
als adhering to feminist values could well choose to engage might be sup-
pressed under the "subordination" rubric.91 Moreover, even if someone
86 Id.; see also Burstyn, supra note 8, at 16-17.
The philosophy underlying the conservative evaluation of sexually explicit material is
rooted firmly in a harsh interpretation of biblical ideas, [one] that defines sexuality... as
a problem: a dangerous, corrupting force that must be contained within the framework
of marriage....
The religious myths that sustain these views come from the old, patriarchal Judeo-
Christian beliefs about the relative merit and place of the sexes ....
[These ideas reflect a profound rejection and fear of women's autonomy and a
consequent degradation of women's sexuality.... But pornography, virtually by defini-
tion, shows sex outside of the monogamous marriage framework... and advocates sex
for every reason but procreation. Consequently, for conservatives, pornography, like
prostitution, is an agent of corruption, subverting the nuclear family and the patriarchal
authority based in it ....
Id. (emphasis in original).
87 Drawing on the history of the "first wave" of feminism in the nineteenth century, Bur-
styn's opening essay cautions that "alliances with non- and antifeminist forces are dangerous,
even when there is apparent agreement on goals," Burstyn, supra note 8, at 14-15, and notes
that "today's trends threaten to replicate the treacherous alliances that brought about the mis-
guided use of state machinery to regulate sexual life during the nineteenth century," id. at 22.
88 See, e.g., King, supra note 83, at 87 (predicting that judges would be likely to find les-
bian images "degrading," and perhaps even "coercive"); Valverde & Weir, Thrills, Chills and
the "Lesbian Threat" or, The Media, the State and Women's Sexuality, in Women Against
Censorship 99, 105 (V. Burstyn ed. 1985) (citing examples of judicial suppression of homosex-
ual images).
89 The model law defines "pornography," in part, as "the graphic sexually explicit subordi-
nation of women through pictures and/or words that also includes... scenarios of degrada-
tion." Dworkin, supra note 29, at 25 (emphasis added).
90 Words and images depicting other sexual acts commonly perceived as aberrant would
also be prime targets under Dworkin-MacKinnon-type laws. See, e.g., Duggan, Hunter &
Vance, supra note 14, at 140 ("This legislation would virtually eliminate all [sado-masochistic]
pornography... thereby attacking a sexual minority while masquerading as an attempt to end
violence against women.").
91 See id.
To some, any graphic sexual act violates women's dignity and therefore subordinates
them. To others, consensual heterosexual lovemaking within the boundaries of procrea-
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might choose not actually to participate in certain sexual conduct, she
could still choose to see depictions of it and find them a source of pleas-
ure. As Sara Diamond's essay in Women Against Censorship points out,
even scenes of ravishment, which could clearly be described as showing a
woman's "subordination," may nevertheless be viewed by some women
as conveying certain ideas that are consistent with feminist values.92
Therefore, to impose some women's or judges' views that these scenes
should be banned would deprive other women of sexually stimulating
and liberating imagery. In Diamond's words, "one woman's porn is an-
other's erotic art."'93
By empowering individuals and government officials who enforce
the law to impose their views of which sexual depictions entail "subordi-
nation" or "degradation," the ordinance denies the inherently personal,
individualized nature of choices about which sexual behavior or imagery
is pleasurable.94 It thus in effect "demand[s] that [women's] fantasies
conform to an abstract ideal of politically correct sex." 95 Regardless of
whether that "ideal" sexuality is defined by a judge who interprets the
ordinance, or by the ordinance's authors, 96 or by anyone else, to impose
it on other persons would be repugnant to the overarching ideals of indi-
vidual privacy and autonomy that are broadly shared by proponents of
feminist and civil liberties values.
tion and marriage is acceptable, but heterosexual acts that do not have reproduction as
their aim lower women's status and hence subordinate them. Still others accept a wide
range of nonprocreative, perhaps even nonmarital, heterosexuality but draw the line at
lesbian sex, which they view as degrading.
Id. (emphasis in original).
92 See Diamond, supra note 28, at 51.
[M]any women fantasize about being ravished. It is not surprising that women
daydream about being uncontrollably desired in a culture in which our value as human
beings is based on our attractiveness, and in which we are constantly prevented from
acting out our desires. If we fantasize a partner taking complete control of a sexual
encounter, then we are absolved from responsibility for our abandoned behavior. In this
way we can mentally break sexual taboos that still remain in place in practice.
Id.; see also Willis, Feminism, Moralism, and Pornography, in Powers of Desire: The Politics
of Sexuality 460, 464 (A. Snitow, C. Stansell & S. Thompson eds. 1983); note 26 supra (state-
ment of Professor Richards).
93 Diamond, supra note 28, at 55.
94 See Richards, supra note 27, at 82.
95 Diamond, supra note 28, at 55.
96 At least one of the authors of the model ordinance apparently regards sex with multiple
partners, group sex, and oral sex as subordinating women. See Duggan, Hunter & Vance,
supra note 14, at 138-39; see also id. at 143 ("[A]dvocates of the ordinance effectively assume
that women have been so conditioned by the pornographic world view that if their own experi-
ences of the sexual acts identified in the definition are not subordinating, then they must simply
be victims of false consciousness."). Moreover, the ordinance ultimately reflects the view that
all heterosexual sex subordinates women. See notes 75-77 and accompanying text supra. In
contrast, government officials charged with implementing the law might well believe that all
homosexual sex subordinates women. See notes 88-90 and accompanying text supra.
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The Dworkin-MacKinnon model legislation subverts feminist val-
ues not only because government officials could interpret it to do so, but
also, more fundamentally, because of its plain terms and intent. The
legislation's language, consistent with the intent of its authors and sup-
porters, actually reinforces negative, sexist stereotypes about women and
men. 97 This argument was asserted in an amicus brief submitted in the
Indianapolis case by The Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce (FACT).
FACT is a group of individuals actively supporting feminist and civil
liberties principles.98 FACT's brief showed how the ordinance not only
failed to promote its asserted purpose of countering sex discrimination,
but, even worse, actually perpetuated sex discrimination. Accordingly,
FACT urged the court to hold the ordinance unconstitutionally discrimi-
natory on the basis of sex.99 The brief argued that the assumptions un-
derlying the ordinance "reinforce and perpetuate central sexist
stereotypes; they weaken, rather than enhance, women's struggles to free
themselves from archaic notions of gender roles.... In treating women
as a special class, [the ordinance] repeats the errors of earlier protection-
ist legislation which gave women no significant benefits and denied their
equality. ' ' 1oo
Various pieces in Women Against Censorship show that the Dwor-
kin-MacKinnon model legislation undermines feminist goals in other sig-
nificant respects, in addition to perpetuating sexist stereotypes and
97 See, e.g., Snitow, supra note 11, at 118.
We do particular injury to feminist work by conflating sex with violence. This is to
cede precious territory to the political opponents of feminism. This is to deny
women any agency at all in the long history of heterosexuality.
It is hard to imagine good organizing that can emerge from this insulting
presumption.
Id.; see also Duggan, Hunter & Vance, supra note 14, at 142-43, 148, 151.
98 FACT Brief, supra note 28, at xii. One of the two co-authors of the FACT brief, Nan
Hunter, is a contributor to Women Against Censorship. See Duggan, Hunter & Vance, supra
note 14. The FACT brief was joined by the Women's Legal Defense Fund and numerous
writers and activists on behalf of women's rights, including: Betty Brooks, the Director of the
Southern California Rape Hotline Alliance and the founder of Women Against Sexual Abuse;
Susan Estrich, a professor at Harvard Law School who has authored works urging reform of
laws governing rape and other violent crimes against women; Betty Friedan, the founding
president of the National Organization for Women and a founding member of the National
Women's Political Caucus; Joan Howarth, an attorney who helped to establish Women
Against Violence Against Women; Kate Millett, author of leading feminist works, including
Sexual Politics and The Prostitution Papers; Adrienne Rich, a widely known lesbian feminist
poet; Sue Deller Ross, a professor at Georgetown University Law Center who co-authored Sex
Discrimination and the Law: Causes and Remedies; Susan Schechter, a leading author and
consultant in the battered women's movement; Alix Kates Shulman, author of feminist novels,
biographies, stories, and essays; and Wendy Webster Williams, a professor at Georgetown
University Law Center who was a founding partner of Equal Rights Advocates. FACT Brief,
supra note 28, at xii-xix. The author of this Essay also joined in the FACT brief. Id. at xviii.
99 E.g., FACT Brief, supra note 28, at 33.
100 Id.
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deflecting concern from sexist and violent imagery that is not sexually
explicit. For example, by asserting that pornography is a central cause of
sex discrimination, this legislation diverts attention and efforts from the
most significant causes of sex discrimination. 10 1 Feminist scholars have
identified the following as far more profound sources of women's
oppression:
sex segregated wage labor markets; systematic devaluation of work tra-
ditionally done by women; sexist concepts of marriage and family; in-
adequate income maintenance programs for women unable to find
wage work; lack of day care services and the premise that child care is
an exclusively female responsibility; barriers to reproductive freedom;
and discrimination and segregation in education and athletics.' 02
Similarly, by blaming pornography for violence against women, the legis-
lation deflects attention and resources from the numerous, complex
causes of such violence 103 and undermines law enforcement efforts to ap-
prehend and prosecute individuals who actually commit violent crimes
against women. 104
Further, as even procensorship feminists acknowledge, 10 5 govern-
ment regulation would probably only drive pornography underground,
enhancing its appeal. 106 And, to the extent that censorship would make
pornographic images less visible, the protest against sexism would be
weakened. As Anna Gronau explains:
The recent rise of violent pornography has coincided with increased
power on the part of women. Censoring this material, I believe, only
abets those who seek a return to the former distribution of power, for
such action will remove the public proof that violence and other
101 See, e.g., Burstyn, supra note 8, at 26-27; Diamond, supra note 28, at 52; Duggan,
Hunter & Vance, supra note 14, at 144; Gronau, supra note 84, at 97-98; Kostash, supra note
27, at 35; Steele, supra note 20, at 6.
102 FACT Brief, supra note 28, at 35-36 (citations omitted).
103 Preface to Pornography and Sexual Aggression at xvii (E. Donnerstein & N. Malamuth
eds. 1984) ("[Ihe obvious fact [is] that, if certain types of pornography are found to cause
sexual aggression, there are clearly many other causal factors that may be at least as important
or even more so."). Ironically, some research indicates that one of these many causal factors
may be the improving legal and economic status of women. See, e.g., Baron & Straus, Sexual
Stratification, Pornography, and Rape, in Pornography and Sexual Aggression 185, 205-06 (E.
Donnerstein & N. Malamuth eds. 1984). Presumably, most proponents of feminist values
would resist any effort to curb advances in women's status on the rationale that they contribute
to antifemale violence, because these advances also have positive, profeminist effects. But the
same could be said of pornography. See text accompanying notes 24-28, 92-93 supra.
104 See note 61 supra.
105 See Callwood, supra note 10, at 123 (arguing that most procensorship feminists see chief
benefit of censoring pornography as symbolic, recognizing that pornography would continue
to flourish underground).
106 See, e.g., Gronau, supra note 84, at 93-94. Some social science research also indicates
that when someone who watches erotic films realizes that they have been censored, his aggres-
sive responses tend to be increased. See note 128 infra.
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wrongs against women continue to exist in society. We may, once
again, begin to doubt our perceptions; censorship seeks to hide the evi-
dence of sexism, silencing those who try to confront it. 10 7
There is yet another significant respect in which feminist principles
would be subverted by laws censoring pornography. Advocates of social
change, including advocates of feminist principles, have a special stake in
preserving our system of free expression from the substantial erosion it
would suffer under any censorship scheme. 108 This point was made elo-
quently by Wendy Kaminer, an activist in the movement fighting vio-
lence against women.
Legislative or judicial control of pornography is simply not possible
without breaking down the legal principles and procedures that are
essential to our own right to speak and, ultimately, our freedom to
control our own lives. We must continue to organize against pornog-
raphy and the degradation and abuse of women, but we cannot ask the
government to take up our struggle for us. The power it would assume
in order to do so would be far more dangerous to us all than the
"power" of pornography. 10 9
The violations of civil liberties and feminist principles that charac-
terize the Dworkin-MacKinnon censorship scheme are not peculiar to
that particular proposal, but inhere in the generic concept of censoring
pornography in order to "protect" women. 110 Accordingly, a variation
on the Dworkin-MacKinnon theme recently advanced by Professor Cass
107 Gronau, supra note 84, at 96. See generally Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An
Essay on Professor Bickel, Justice Harlan, and the Enduring Significance of Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 1980 Duke L.J. 283, 301-03 (1980) ("[T]he most highly offensive forms of expression
communicate an important truth about the offensiveness of the speaker's message [and there-
fore should be included in] the marketplace of ideas because they help [it] reject false, ugly
ideas by revealing them for what they are.").
108 Precisely this point was made by both judges who wrote the opinions holding the Indi-
anapolis ordinance unconstitutional. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp.
1316, 1337 (D. Ind. 1984) (Barker, J.), aff'd, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1983) (Easterbrook, J.),
aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986).
Historically, the suppression of free speech has been a major tactic of the antifeminist
movement. From 1873 until 1971, the Comstock Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1462 (1982) & 19
U.S.C. § 1305 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984), was used to suppress information about contraception
and abortion, see, e.g., United States v. One Book, Entitled "Contraceptions," 51 F.2d 525
(S.D.N.Y. 1931); United States v. One Obscene Book Entitled "Married Love," 48 F.2d 821
(S.D.N.Y. 1931).
More recently, repeated attempts have been made to ban the feminist magazine Ms. from
high school libraries. See, e.g., Salvail v. Nashua, 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979).
109 Kaminer, supra note 33, at 756.
110 See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) ("[I]f the
statutory objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of one gender because they are presumed
to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegiti-
mate."); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion) ("Traditionally,
[sex] discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practi-
cal effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.").
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Sunstein1 11 is subject to essentially the same criticisms as the Dworkin-
MacKinnon model itself.
Sunstein suggests that antipornography legislation should be limited
to materials that "sexualize violence against women," are "devoid of seri-
ous social value," and contain some visual elements. He also proposes
that any work should be "taken as a whole" to determine whether it
conforms to these criteria. 112 However, Sunstein does not offer a con-
vincing argument that regulating even this theoretically smaller category
of sexually explicit speech" 3 is consistent with civil liberties 14 or femi-
nist principles. With respect to feminist principles, he apparently accepts
the Dworkin-MacKinnon view of pornography as the only feminist view.
Although the Sunstein piece cites an otherwise impressive array of works
from various disciplines and perspectives, it omits any reference to the
feminist "pro-sex" literature and other related writings about the positive
aspects of pornography. 115
Sunstein's flawed rationales for justifying censorship stem from his
acceptance of the Dworkin-MacKinnon view about the nature and effects
of pornography. He categorizes pornography as "low value" speech,' 16
ignoring the important messages such speech conveys concerning a range
of philosophical, political, and even profeminist themes.117 He argues
that censoring pornography will reduce sexual violence against
women, 118 notwithstanding the dearth of evidence to support a causal
111 See Sunstein, supra note 15.
112 Id. at 592, 624-25.
113 In practice, the Sunstein model is necessarily over- and underinclusive for the same
reasons that the Dworkin-MacKinnon model is-namely, that "pornography" cannot be de-
fined with the requisite objectivity or specificity to ensure a narrow application consistent with
feminist and civil liberties concerns. See text accompanying notes 65-75, 80-87 supra.
114 Sunstein acknowledges that "dangers [are] posed by generating a somewhat different
category of regulable speech bound to have some definitional vagueness." Sunstein, supra note
15, at 627. He contends, however, that this danger has been exaggerated because his proposed
new type of content or viewpoint based regulation is analogous to other such regulations that
the Supreme Court has upheld. See id. at 609-17, 627. One problem with this argument is that
the decisions upholding analogous regulations upon which Sunstein relies are themselves
troublesome, from a civil liberties perspective, and therefore should be strictly limited. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) (government may prohibit employers
from making unfavorable statements about effects of unionization during certain period before
union elections if statements might be interpreted as threats). Sunstein himself acknowledges
the forceful criticisms that have been leveled at Gissel and related decisions curtailing speech in
the labor relations context. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 614 n. 145.
115 See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
116 Sunstein, supra note 15, at 602-08, 617.
117 American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 106 S.
Ct. 1172 (1986) (noting political significance ascribed to pornography by procensorship stat-
ute); see text accompanying notes 21-28 supra.
118 Sunstein, supra note 15, at 616.
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connection between exposure to pornography and such violence. 119
Moreover, he asserts that the harm allegedly produced by pornography
cannot be adequately countered by more speech,' 20 despite persuasive
evidence to the contrary. 21
Sunstein concludes that "the pornography industry is so well fi-
nanced, and has such power to condition men and women, that it has the
effect of silencing the antipornography cause in particular and women in
general."' 22 However, there is scant evidence that the pornography in-
dustry does in fact possess this asserted power. To the contrary, both
champions of the antipornography cause and women in general not only
have vigorously exercised their free speech rights, but also have had some
palpable impact on public perceptions and public policy in conse-
quence. 123 Moreover, far from stimulating free speech by women, femi-
nists, and antipornography activists, the suppression of pornography
could well have the opposite effect. 124 Contrary to Sunstein's hypothesis
that protecting free speech entrenches the status quo,12 5 free speech prin-
ciples have consistently been invoked to amplify the voices of those who
challenge the status quo, including advocates of feminist principles. 126
III
THERE IS No EVIDENCE THAT CENSORSHIP OF
PORNOGRAPHY WOULD REDUCE SEXISM OR
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
The feminists who advocate censoring pornography rest their case
on the assumption that such censorship would reduce sexism and vio-
lence against women. 127 This assumption in turn reflects two others,
both highly questionable: that there is a causal nexus between exposure
119 See text accompanying notes 134-55 infra.
120 Sunstein, supra note 15, at 617.
121 See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra and 156-57 infra.
122 Sunstein, supra note 15, at 618. Sunstein advances this argument despite his concession
that, in general, "inquiries into substantive powerlessness should not be used to defend restric-
tions on expression." Id. at 623.
123 See text accompanying notes 11, 18, 34-35 supra. Indeed, Sunstein's assertion that the
antipornography cause has been silenced is belied by, among other things, the outpouring of
writings about that cause in various types of publications, including respected law journals
such as the one in which Sunstein's own piece was published. See note 15 supra.
124 See text accompanying note 107 supra.
125 See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 620.
126 See text accompanying notes 108-109 supra.
127 A widely quoted formulation of this view is Robin Morgan's statement that
"[p]ornography is the theory and rape the practice." R. Morgan, Going Too Far 163 (1978).
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to pornography and misogynist attitudes and behavior; and that cen-
sorhip would significantly reduce exposure to pornography. 28
According to censorship advocates, the asserted causal nexus be-
tween pornography and sexism is allegedly demonstrated by certain so-
cial science data.129 However, as noted above, the causes of sex
discrimination and violence against women are numerous and com-
plex.130 Further, even assuming that one such cause were exposure to
sexist or violent images, pornography constitutes only a small subset of
the sexist and violent imagery that pervades our culture.' 31
For the foregoing reasons, the censorship of pornography would be
an ineffective means of countering misogynist attitudes or behavior. It
would address neither most sexist, violent imagery, nor the numerous
causes of sexism and violence against women that are independent of
images. Therefore, even assuming some causal link between pornogra-
phy and these phenomena, the necessarily insignificant contribution cen-
sorship might make to reducing them 132 would probably not outweigh
the substantial damage censorship would do to feminist and civil liberties
principles. Moreover, the lack of actual evidence to substantiate the al-
leged causal link reinforces the conclusion that the purported benefits of
censorship would not offset its adverse impact. 133
The relatively few social science studies concerning the alleged
causal nexus between pornography and sexist or violent attitudes or be-
havior are described and analyzed by York University anthropology pro-
fessor Thelma McCormack in a useful appendix to Women Against
Censorship.134 These studies recently have been subject to much analy-
sis, 135 especially because they were invoked by the widely publicized
128 Not only is it dubious that censorship would substantially reduce the audience for por-
nography, as opposed to forcing it underground, but, even worse, some evidence suggests that
the viewer's aggressive response to an erotic film may be increased by his awareness that the
film has been censored. See Brock, Erotic Materials: A Commodity Theory Analysis of Availa-
bility and Desirability, in 7 Technical Report of the U.S. Comm'n on Obscenity & Pornogra-
phy 13-17 (1971); Tannenbaum, Emotional Arousal As a Mediator of Communication Effects,
in 8 Technical Report of the U.S. Comm'n on Obscenity & Pornography 326-56 (1971);
Worchel & Arnold, Effects of Censorship and Attractiveness of the Censor on Attitudinal
Change, 9 J. Experimental Soc. Psychology 365 (1973).
129 See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 52-56.
130 See notes 59, 102-103 and accompanying text supra.
131 See text accompanying note 78 supra.
132 Contributors to Women Against Censorship note that "even if porn were to miraculously
disappear, violence against women would continue as long as other oppressive structures re-
mained in place." Diamond, supra note 28, at 49; accord Snitow, supra note 11, at 117.
133 See text accompanying notes 63-126 supra.
134 See McCormack, Making Sense of Research on Pornography, in Women Against Cen-
sorship, app. 183-205 (V. Burstyn ed. 1985).
135 See, e.g., id.; FACT Brief, supra note 28, at 18-27; Lynn, supra note 58, at 65-73; Rich-
ards, Pornography Commissions and the First Amendment: On Constitutional Values and
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Meese Commission Report.136 This Essay will not rehash the substan-
tial body of literature evaluating the relevant social science data. Rather,
it will briefly outline some of the major criticisms that have been leveled
at assertions that these data support a causal link between being exposed
to pornography and holding negative attitudes toward, or committing
violence against, women.
Professor McCormack's comprehensive review of the relevant re-
search results summarizes what those data show about the social effects
of pornography.
Studies of sex offenders provide no basis for establishing a connection
between pornography and rape.
... Explicit depictions of sexual activity, coercive or not, can induce
states of sex arousal and sexual fantasies in both men and women. The
fantasy may act as a substitute for an overt sexual act; it may act as an
enhancement of sexual activity, it may lead to sexual activity. All of
these responses have been documented. Sexual fantasy, then, is a poor
predictor of behavior ....
There is no systematic evidence that people copy what they see or
read about in pornography. On the contrary, there is sharp evidence
that sex patterns, once established, are as difficult to change as any
Constitutional Facts, 39 Me. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1987); ACLU Report, supra note 23, at 75-
88.
For example, the Lynn piece, supra note 58, notes numerous reasons why censorship of
pornography is not justified by the experimental findings reported by Professors Edward Don-
nerstein and Neil Malamuth, data frequently invoked by proponents of Dworkin-MacKinnon-
type laws. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 52-56. The male subjects in these experi-
ments manifested increased negative and aggressive attitudes toward women after seeing films
containing violent sexual imagery.
Lynn pointed to the following reasons that the Donnerstein and Malamuth studies have
limited implications for social policy generally and do not support the censorship of pornogra-
phy in particular: the studies show "only correlation, not causation"; the experimental popula-
tion samples were "extraordinarily small"; "such studies may be missing a crucial variable" by
not examining the subjects' feelings about sexuality based on their past development and expe-
rience, Lynn, supra note 58, at 66; "the duration of the reported effects is unknown," id. at 67;
the films involved in the studies, which depicted violent rape only, differed from most porno-
graphic films actually shown in the real world, therefore exacerbating the omnipresent
problems with extrapolating projections from results obtained in artificial laboratory settings,
id. at 67-68; the level of aggression displayed in these studies may well exceed the level that
would be manifested outside the laboratory setting because aggression is allowed or even en-
couraged by the researcher in the laboratory, and the disinhibitory incentives that would oper-
ate in the real world are absent, id. at 68; the studies do not show that men are induced to
commit sexual aggression by seeing depictions of it, id. at 69; and negative attitudes following
exposure to pornography during the experiments "can be combatted through the [subsequent]
presentation of alternative ideas," id.; see also text accompanying notes 145-57 infra (noting
that Donnerstein and Malamuth themselves criticize use of their research to justify censoring
pornography).
136 See Meese Commission Report, supra note 16, at 324-29.
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other social habits, and, in addition, there are strong inhibiting factors
that intervene to keep our responses within the cultural norms.137
The most recent thorough assessment of the pertinent social science
data was commissioned by the 1985 Fraser Commission in Canada. 138
This review concluded that much of the research was conceptually
flawed and that, taken as a whole, the results were inconclusive. 139 Simi-
larly, based on their own surveys of the social science data, previous gov-
ernmental commissions on pornography concluded that there was no
significant causal connection between the use of pornography and vio-
lence against women. 4°
Even the recent Meese Commission Report, which endorsed more
regulation of sexually explicit speech than previous governmental com-
missions, recognized that much of the data cited to support an alleged
causal relationship between pornography and sexual violence does not in
fact show such a connection.14 1 The Meese Commission Report further
acknowledged that "[t]he contribution of pornography to sexual devi-
ance remains very much an open question." 1 4 2 And to the extent that the
Meese Commission Report did purport to find some causal link between
pornography and antisocial attitudes or conduct, 43 these findings have
been subject to harsh criticism. 44 In particular, three of the foremost
researchers in the area, Professors Edward Donnerstein, Daniel Linz,
and Neil Malamuth, have disputed these findings. 45
137 McCormack, supra note 134, at 198.
138 Meese Commission Report, supra note 16, at 909 (citing McKay & Dolff, The Impact of
Pornography: An Analysis of Research and Summary of Findings, in Report of the Special
Committee on Pornography and Prostitution (1985)).
139 See Meese Commission Report, supra note 16, at 909-10.
140 See 1970 Commission Report, supra note 23, at 227-43.
141 See Meese Commission Report, supra note 16, at 315-20.
142 Id. at 975; see also id. at 312-13 (discounting witnesses' allegations that exposure to
pornography had induced them to commit sex crimes because of "tendency of people to exter-
nalize their own problems by looking too easily for some external source beyond their
control").
143 See id. at 324-27.
144 See Hertzberg, Big Boobs, The New Republic, July 14 & 21, 1986, at 21-24; Lynn, supra
note 58, at 65-73; Richards, supra note 27, at 44-45; ACLU Report, supra note 23, at 64-80;
see also J. Becker & E. Levine, Statement 4 (1984) (unpublished statement by members of
Meese Commission on file at New York University Law Review) ("The idea that eleven indi-
viduals studying in their spare time could complete a comprehensive report on so complex a
matter in so constricted a timeframe is simply unrealistic. No self-respecting investigator
would accept conclusions based on such a study.").
145 See Donnerstein & Linz, The Question of Pornography, Psychology Today, Dec. 1986,
at 56-59.
As social scientists and two of the researchers whose work was cited throughout the
[Meese Commission Report], we feel it necessary to point out that the report fell short of
our expectations in several important respects. First, there are factual problems with the
report, representing serious errors of commission. Several of the contentions made in its
pages cannot be supported by empirical evidence. Some commission members appar-
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Although their experiments are cited by advocates of censorship (in-
cluding the Meese Commission),146 Professors Donnerstein, Linz, and
Malamuth interpret their research differently. 147 They stress that their
data show at most that exposure to aggressive or violent pornography 148
may lead to short-term attitudinal changes, 149 which are readily dispelled
by exposure to other material,1 50 and that the data provide no evidence
ently did not understand or chose not to heed some of the fundamental assumptions in
the social science resarch on pornography. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the
commission members have committed a serious error of omission. The single most im-
portant problem in the media today, as clearly indicated by social science research, is
not pornography but violence.
Id. at 56; see also Researchers Dispute Pornography Report on Its Use of Data, N.Y. Times,
May 17, 1986, at Al.
146 See, e.g., Meese Commission Report, supra note 16, at 324-29; Jacobs, supra note 6, at
10-11; MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 52 n.1 16, 55.
147 See note 145 supra; note 154 infra. Nor are they the only researchers who believe their
findings have been misinterpreted. The Baron and Straus correlational study, see Baron &
Straus, supra note 25, for example, is widely relied on by advocates of censorship, see, e.g.,
Meese Commission Report, supra note 16, at 324-29; MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 51 n. 113.
However, Professor Murray Straus himself has stated that his research does not support cen-
sorship. See J. Becker & E. Levine, supra note 144, at 12-13.
In documents attached to the main report mention has been made of a possible relation-
ship between circulation rates of pornographic magazines and sex crime rates. One of
the authors of the study on which the Commission has based its conclusions, Murray
Straus, has written to explain his own research, which he suggested has been misinter-
preted. "I do not believe that this research demonstrates that pornography causes rape
.... In general the scientific evidence clearly indicates that if one is concerned with the
effects of media on rape, the problem lies in the prevalence of violence in the media, not
on sex in the media."
Id.; see also Donnerstein & Linz, supra note 145, at 56-59 (summarizing specific criticisms of
Meese Commission's misinterpretations of social science data, including Donnerstein and
Linz's own research findings).
What we have is a picture of violent pornography that is somewhat different from that
drawn by the commission. We do not, as yet, know if the detrimental effects of watching
pornography are long-lived or only fleeting. We do know that it is specifically the por-
nographic materials that depict women "enjoying" rape that are especially damaging,
but it remains unclear whether all men are affected equally even by these bizarre scripts.
Finally, it remains to be seen whether changes in attitudes about women and rape re-
vealed in relatively small-scale tests have any applicability to rape and aggression in the
real world.... The commission members were obviously aware of these issues. In fact,
these conclusions, well-grounded in scientific research, are briefly summarized deep
within their report, which makes it even more perplexing that they ignore the data in
making their 92 recommendations.
Id.
148 These terms refer to "portrayals in which physical force is either used or threatened to
coerce a woman to engage in sexual acts (e.g., rape)." Malamuth, Aggression Against Women:
Cultural and Individual Causes, in Pornography and Sexual Aggression 19, 29 (E. Donnerstein
& N. Malamuth eds. 1984).
149 See Donnerstein & Linz, supra note 145, at 57 ("For the moment .... we do not know if
repeated exposure [to pornography] has a cumulative effect or if such effects are only tempo-
rary. But the evidence, such as it is, points toward the latter conclusion.").
150 See text accompanying note 157 infra.
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that exposure to violent pornography increases the probability that the
reader or viewer will actually commit harmful acts. 151 Moreover, Profes-
sors Donnerstein, Linz, and Malamuth have emphasized that prohibiting
sexually explicit imagery misses the core of the problem, because the
temporary attitudinal changes that did occur in limited experimental
populations 52 were linked more closely to the violence than to the sex in
the violent pornography at issue.153 These social scientists have accord-
ingly suggested that, if any images are to be suppressed in an effort to
combat such short-term attitudinal changes, 54 it would be more appro-
priate to target the numerous images of violence against women that per-
vade the nonpornographic media. 155
The research of Professors Donnerstein and Malamuth has further
suggested that, even if images of violence against women foster negative
attitudes toward women, censorship still would not be a rational strategy
for combating such attitudes. That conclusion follows from the effective-
ness of postexperimental debriefing sessions, in which subjects' negative
attitudes were reduced after receiving information about violence against
women. Moreover, this combined exposure to pornography and infor-
mation apparently reduced negative attitudes even more effectively than
exposure to the information alone would have done.' 56 Consequently,
151 See Donnerstein & Linz, supra note 145, at 58; see also note 135 supra (discussing why
social science data do not establish causal link between pornography and actual harmful
behavior).
152 See note 135 supra.
153 Referring to a study they had conducted with Professor Berkowitz, as well as a study by
Professors Malamuth and Check, Professors Donnerstein and Linz explained:
Taken together, these studies strongly suggest that violence against women need not
occur in a pornographic or sexually explicit context to have a negative effect upon
viewer attitudes and behavior. But even more importantly, it must be concluded that
violent images, rather than sexual ones, are most responsible for people's attitudes about
women and rape.
Donnerstein & Linz, supra note 145, at 59; accord H. Eysenk & D. Nias, Sex, Violence and the
Media (1978).
154 This is not to imply that any of these researchers has endorsed the censorship of any
type of imagery. See, e.g., Malamuth, supra note 148, at 41 (disclaiming any intent to endorse
censorship or any other strategy for inducing changes in media content).
155 See Donnerstein & Linz, in Pornography: Love or Death?, Film Comment, Dec. 1984,
at 29, 35 ("Images [of violence against women] outside of the pornographic... market may in
fact be of more concern, since they are imbued with a certain 'legitimacy'... ."); Malamuth &
Lindstrom, in Pornography: Love or Death?, Film Comment, Dec. 1984, at 29, 40 ("Attempts
to alter the content of mass media... can not be limited to pornography, since research has
documented similar effects from mainstream movies.").
156 See, e.g., Malamuth & Donnerstein, The Effects of Aggressive-Pornographic Mass Me-
dia Stimuli, in 15 Advances in Experimental Psychology 103, 129 (1982). These results
strengthen the contention of anticensorship feminists that a more effective way to combat sex-
ist attitudes is speech challenging those attitudes. Cf. Stone, supra note 15, at 480.
Our acceptance of racist expression has changed radically in recent years without the aid
of government suppression. Individuals who once found the characterization in "Amos
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the research indicates that education is more effective than censorship for
countering misogynistic stereotypes. 157
Thus, the harmful effects of pornographic speech are best eliminated
by "more speech." In that case, censorship is intolerable. 158 The specu-
lative possibility that exposure to violent pornography might cause ag-
gressive attitudes that will not be corrected through more speech is too
negligible a benefit to outweigh the substantial costs censorship would
impose on feminist and civil liberties principles. 159 Any potential harm
must instead be addressed by measures that are consistent with feminist
and civil liberties principles.
IV
NONCENSORSHIP STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING SEXISM AND
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, CONSISTENT WITH
BOTH FEMINIST AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
PRINCIPLES
A major unifying theme of the various essays in Women Against
Censorship is that, rather than advocating censorship of pornography,
with censorship's adverse effects upon feminist and civil libertarian prin-
ciples, those who support the underlying goals of the feminist movement
to censor pornography-namely, the elimination of sex discrimination
and violence against women-should instead pursue those goals through
means consistent with feminist and civil liberties principles. In the realm
and Andy" amusing would now be shocked to see their children amused by such fare. A
similar change is possible with respect to pornography.
Id.
157 See, e.g., Donnerstein & Linz, supra note 155, at 35; Malamuth, supra note 148, at 45-
47.
158 For the seminal enunciation of this principle, see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). For an example of a more recent case applying the
concept, see Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (hold-
ing unconstitutional city's denial of permit to Nazis seeking to march in Skokie, Illinois). Op-
portunity to respond is not required for a suppression of speech to be held unconstitutional.
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1966) (finding first amendment violated by statute
prohibiting editorials on election day). An opportunity for more speech simply strengthens the
case against suppression.
159 Even if the social science data could establish that pornography has a general tendency
to foster negative attitudes or behavior, that still would not justify censorship. All but the
blandest speech could be said to have such general "bad tendencies" in terms of its potential
impact upon its audience. Protection of free expression would consequently be eviscerated if
this constituted a sufficient justification for censorship. Accordingly, as a precondition for
suppressing any speech because of its alleged impact on its audience, first amendment doctrine
demands a close causal connection between the speech and a grave social harm, as well as
intent to cause such harm on the speaker's part. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447-48 (1969) (reversing conviction of Ku Klux Klan members and expressly rejecting argu-
ment that abstract advocacy of violence could be punished or suppressed because of general
tendency to lead to violence).
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of imagery, several essays in the book stress that, rather than seeking to
suppress sexually explicit imagery that might convey negative views of
women, proponents of feminist and civil liberties principles should in-
stead concentrate on creating and distributing images that convey posi-
tive views of women. Sara Diamond, for example, urges feminists to
spend their time and energy "seeking resources to allow women to flood
the market with feminist productions ... [because] [w]idely distributed
feminist imagery would be a provocative and active contradiction to the
sexist imagery of all the current mass media."160 In a similar vein, several
essays suggest that advocates of feminist and civil libertarian values
should encourage governmental measures that would assist small-scale
publishing houses and other potential distributors of "prowoman and sex
positive" imagery,161 rather than governmental regulation or prohibition
of pornographic images.
Moving beyond the realm of images, contributors to Women Against
Censorship propose measures that would deal directly with the harms
allegedly caused or exacerbated by pornographic images. For example,
they urge invigorated enforcement of already existing laws penalizing co-
ercion, sexual harassment, assault, rape, and economic exploitation. 162
Furthermore, they urge enactment of new laws to ensure job safety for
women who choose to become models for pornographic works. 163
Finally, in her closing essay in Women Against Censorship, which is
appropriately entitled "Beyond Despair: Positive Strategies," Varda
Burstyn sets out a comprehensive list of alternatives designed to decrease
sex discrimination and violence against women. She classifies these
measures into the following methods or areas for change: "The Legal
Front"; 164 "Protest and Direct Action"; 165 "Alternatives to Pornogra-
160 Diamond, supra note 28, at 53; accord Burstyn, supra note 59, at 165; Steele, supra note
20, at 59, 74-76; Valverde & Weir, supra note 88, at 105.
161 Diamond, supra note 28, at 57; see also Burstyn, supra note 59, at 165 (urging that taxes
on commercial media be used to help finance noncommercial undertakings); Steele, supra note
20, at 74 (citing recommendation by Canada's National Action Committee on the Status of
Women that the government establish a women's television network); id. at 75 (stating that
supporters of feminist goals should seek governmental measures assisting small publishing
houses, including favorable postal and tax rates).
162 See, e.g., Burstyn, supra note 59, at 160-61.
163 See, e.g., id. at 167 (arguing that feminist approach to needs of "sex-workers" should
seek both to improve quality of their present working lives and to create meaningful alterna-
tives to sex-work); Duggan, Hunter & Vance, supra note 14, at 148 (asserting that laws based
upon Dworkin-MacKinnon proposal would drive pornography industry underground, making
it more difficult to regulate for purposes of protecting models).
164 Burstyn, supra note 59, at 158-61.
165 Id. at 161. For examples of potential tactics in this category, see Morgan, How to Run
Pornographers Out of Town and Preserve the First Amendment, Ms., Nov. 1978, at 55, 78-80
(recommending boycotting products advertised in ways that demean women, picketing por-
nography shops and confronting their customers, urging magazines and newspapers not to
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phy"; 166 "The Sex Industry"; 167 "Economic Independence for Women
and Youth";1 68 "Reproductive and Erotic Rights for Women and Sexual
Minorities"; 169 and "Sexual Rights for Children and Youth." 1 70 Burstyn
acknowledges that the proposals she outlines "are not easy or cheap to
implement," t 7' but she offers this explanation:
Feminists who oppose censorship-a strategy that takes little time or
reflection to expound-do not have another slogan, another quick so-
lution, another panacea to offer in its place. We do have a comprehen-
sive list of tasks we must carry out to bring sexism and violence to an
end. Working on any one of these is more helpful-immediately, not
in the distant future-than supporting censorship of any kind today,
for these tasks get at the structural basis of sexism and violence, and
thus insure that we will have a future.172
CONCLUSION
Although the contributors to Women Against Censorship represent a
range of backgrounds and approaches, they are unanimous in recogniz-
ing that censorship of pornography would significantly damage both fem-
inist and civil libertarian principles without securing any substantial
countervailing gains in terms of reduced discrimination or violence
against women. On the contrary, they show that censorship would per-
petuate the underlying causes of sexism. These essays constitute a pow-
erful collective endorsement of the notion that, in the editor's apt phrase,
censorship would obstruct rather than open "the road to freedom for
women and sexual joy for all.' 73
include pornographic advertising, attempting to expose those who profit from pornography,
and urging public officials to refrain from cooperating with pornographic publications); note
34 supra (discussing antipornogrpahy strategies that individuals and organizations have actu-
ally utilized).
166 Burstyn, supra note 59, at 161-66.
167 Id. at 166-69.
168 Id. at 169-71.
169 Id. at 171-73.
170 Id. at 173-78.
171 Id. at 178.
172 Id. at 179.
173 Id. at 180.
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